Considerations of fairness and strategy: experimental data from sequential games by V. Prasnikar & A. Roth
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games
Author(s): Vesna Prasnikar and Alvin E. Roth
Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 865-888
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118366
Accessed: 07/12/2010 13:43
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly Journal of
Economics.
http://www.jstor.orgCONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEGY: 
EXPERIMENTAL  DATA FROM SEQUENTIAL  GAMES* 
VESNA  PRASNIKAR  AND ALVIN  E.  ROTH 
Laboratory data from bargaining  experiments  have started  a debate about the 
prospects  for various  parts  of  game  theory  as  descriptive  theories  of  observable 
behavior,  and  about  whether,  to  what  extent,  and  how  a  successful  descriptive 
theory  must  take  into  account  peoples'  perceptions  of  "fairness."  Plausible 
explanations  of the observed bargaining phenomena  advanced by different investiga- 
tors lead to markedly  different  predictions  about what  should  be observed  in three 
different  games.  A sharp experimental  test  is thus  possible  on this  class  of games, 
and the present  paper reports the results  of such a test. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In  recent  years  experimental  evidence  has  started  a  debate 
about the prospects  for various  parts of game theory  as descriptive 
theories  of  observable  behavior,  and  about  whether,  to  what 
extent,  and  how  a  successful  descriptive  theory  must  take  into 
account  peoples'  perceptions  of  "fairness."  These  are  questions 
that  may  eventually  have  very  different  answers  in  different 
domains  of  application,  as  well  as  for  different  parts  of  game 
theory. 
For a simple class of sequential  bargaining  games, the evidence 
available  to  date  has  permitted  different  investigators  to  draw 
almost  opposite  conclusions.  Some  authors  have  concluded  that 
game  theory  is  without  descriptive  power,  particularly  when 
equilibrium  predictions  call for very unequal payoffs to the bargain- 
ers, and that  a descriptive  theory  of behavior  in games  of this  sort 
must  essentially  be a theory  of what  constitutes  fair distributions 
of income.  Other  authors,  viewing  data from  similar  games,  have 
concluded  that  with  appropriate  experience  in  suitable  environ- 
ments,  subjects  will  quickly  come  to  behave  according  to  the 
straightforward  predictions  of  subgame  perfect  equilibrium.  In 
this  view, the phenomena  that  the first group of authors  attribute 
to  subjects'  considerations  of  fairness  can  instead  be  largely 
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attributed  to inexperience.  A summary  of some  of the  high  points 
of this debate'  is contained  in the paper by Ochs and Roth [1989]. 
The hypotheses  put forward on both sides of this debate can be 
viewed as sequential  in nature.  For example, Guth and Tietz  [1988] 
have suggested  that if the equilibrium  of a game involves  divisions 
that  are too extreme,  strategic  considerations  will be displaced  by 
considerations  of fairness.2 On the other hand, explanations  based 
on  experience  see  elementary  considerations  of  fairness  being 
displaced  by  more  strategic  considerations  as  experience  and 
understanding  are acquired.3 
Some  recent  experimental  results  reported  by  Harrison  and 
Hirshleifer  [1989]  as part of an investigation  concerned,  not  with 
bargaining,  but with mechanisms  for the provision  of public goods, 
nevertheless  present  the  opportunity  to  make  a  fairly  sharp 
experimental  test  of how  considerations  of fairness  and  strategy 
interact  in bargaining.4  The reason  is that  the  "best-shot"  games 
which they  study (to be described below) have essentially  the same 
perfect  equilibrium  behavior  as  "ultimatum"  bargaining  games 
(also described below) but give players very different  incentives  off 
the equilibrium  path.  And  the  experimentally  observed  behavior 
reported  for the  two  kinds  of games  are very  different:  Harrison 
and Hirshleifer  report observations  very near  the  perfect  equilib- 
rium predictions,  which give the players very unequal  distributions 
of income,  while  ultimatum  bargaining  games  have been  robustly 
observed  in many experiments  to yield  much more equal distribu- 
tions  of  income.  So  one  hypothesis  is  that  the  difference  in  the 
observed behavior  has to do with the  strategic  differences  between 
the two games. 
But  Harrison  and  Hirshleifer's  experiments  were  conducted 
under  conditions  in  which  subjects  were  not  informed  of  one 
another's  payoffs,  so another  hypothesis  is that  the  difference  in 
observed  behavior  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  were  not  able  to 
1.  See  Guth,  Schmittberger,  and  Schwarz  [1982];  Binmore,  Shaked,  and 
Sutton  [1985,  1988]; Neelin,  Sonnenschein,  and Spiegel  [1988]. 
2.  It has further  been suggested  that  subjects'  perceptions  of fairness  draw on 
social norms that are themselves  accessed hierarchically,  with some rules of division 
replacing  others  in those  situations  in which  sufficient  information  is available  to 
the  players  about  one  another's  payoffs.  For  example,  Guth  [1988]  explains  the 
experimental  results  of Roth  and Murnighan  [1982]  in  this  way.  See  also  Foddy 
[1989] for a closely related explanation  of that data. 
3.  This point of view is very clearly expressed,  for example,  in Harrison  [1990] 
and Harrison  and McCabe [1991]. 
4.  However,  we should  emphasize  that  our investigation  does not address  the 
cognitive  processes  by which  subjects  arrive at tradeoffs  between  considerations  of 
fairness  and of strategy. CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEGY  867 
compare their  payoffs, and that  notions  of fairness  would  come to 
the  fore  if  the  experiment  were  repeated  under  conditions  like 
those  of the ultimatum  experiments. 
To distinguish  between  these  "strategic"  and  "information" 
hypotheses,  the first part of the present paper reports an experimen- 
tal comparison  between  best-shot  and ultimatum  games conducted 
under  comparable  information  conditions  (and between  best-shot 
games conducted  under different information  conditions). 
When  the  results  of  these  comparisons  were  circulated  for 
comments  [Prasnikar  and Roth,  1989],  a new hypothesis  about the 
difference  between  best-shot  and ultimatum  games  was raised  by 
Guth  [personal  communication]  and Guth  and  Tietz  [1990],  who 
noted that the set of feasible  agreement  payoffs in best-shot  games 
is not  convex.  In particular,  Guth  and  Tietz  observed  that  there 
was  no  Pareto  optimal  agreement  that  gave  both  players  equal 
payoffs,  and they  suggested  that  considerations  of fairness  might 
not  arise  in  such  games.  To address  this  issue,  we  have  added  a 
third comparison  game,  a multiplayer  market  game with  a convex 
set  of agreement  payoffs,  all of which  are Pareto  optimal,  whose 
equilibrium  predicts  unequal  payoffs  comparable  to  the  equilib- 
rium predictions  for the other two games. 
In this  connection,  a comment  on method  seems  appropriate. 
Both  in economics  and in other  scientific  disciplines,  it is perhaps 
more traditional  than  is generally  acknowledged  for investigators 
with  very  different  hypotheses  to largely  ignore  each  other,  or to 
address  each  other  only  tangentially.  This  is  partly  because  dif- 
ferent  hypotheses  suggest  different  directions  for  further  work. 
And this  is as true  for experiments  as for other  kinds  of research: 
the  experimental  comparisons  that  seem  most  appropriate  for 
refining  a hypothesis  and  testing  it  against  its  near  alternatives 
may be very different  for different  hypotheses.  The consequence  is 
that  different  groups  of  investigators  concerned  with  related 
phenomena  may each  discount  the  importance  of what  the  other 
group regards as the most important  part of the evidence.  To some 
extent  this  has  been  the  case  in  the  experimental  study  of 
sequential  bargaining:  investigators  who  emphasize  social  norms 
have concentrated  primarily on single-period  games,  while investi- 
gators  who  emphasize  strategic  considerations  have  primarily 
concentrated  on  multiperiod  games.5  The  present  paper  is  an 
5.  Guth,  Ockenfels,  and Tietz  [1990]  note  [p. 6] that  "In spite of the apparent 
popularity  of  ultimatum  bargaining  few  experiments  have  tried  to  explore  the 
behavior  in the basic game situation....  To our knowledge  this  has been done only 868  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
attempt  to address this  situation  by comparing  three  single-period 
games that  are interpretable  in terms  of the hypotheses  in the two 
parallel literatures  on this  subject. We hope that  this  kind of cross 
fertilization  may  help  suggest  refinements  of  both  kinds  of 
hypotheses. 
This paper is organized  as follows.  Section  II briefly describes 
ultimatum  and best-shot  games,  and the results  obtained  for these 
games  by previous  experimenters.  Section  III  describes  our  new 
experimental  comparisons  involving  these  games,  and Sections  IV 
and V analyze  and interpret  the  results.  Section  VI discusses  the 
hypothesis  raised by Guth  and Tietz  to account  for these  results, 
and  presents  the  further  experimental  comparison  designed  to 
address this hypothesis.  Section VII concludes. 
II.  PRIOR EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS 
A. Ultimatum  Games 
An ultimatum  bargaining  game is a two-person  game played as 
follows.  There  is  some  quantity  Q  of  money  to  be  divided,  and 
player  1 makes  a proposal  of the  form  (x1, x2), where x2 =  Q -  x1. 
Player  2  then  has  an  opportunity  either  to  accept  or reject  this 
proposal: if player 2 accepts,  then  player 1 receives x1, and player 2 
receives  x2 =  Q -  x1; if player 2 rejects,  then  each player receives 
zero. 
Under the assumption  that each player's own monetary  payoff 
is a measure  of his  utility,  the  perfect  equilibrium  prediction  for 
this game is that player 1 will demand all (or, in the case of discrete 
payoffs, almost  all) of the profit, and that player 2 will accept. That 
is,  the  division  of  Q that  results  from  perfect  equilibrium  gives 
player  1 a payoff of Q (or Q -  e  if there  is some  smallest  divisible 
quantity  eof  money), and player 2 a payoff of zero (or e). 
Observed experimental  results  have been quite different,  with 
player  l's,  predominantly  offering  player  2's  much  larger  shares 
(typically  in  the  neighborhood  of 40  percent  of Q: See  Guth  and 
Teitz  [1990]  for a survey).  Similar  results  have  been  observed  in 
two-period  or  multiperiod  extensions  of  the  game,  in  which  a 
rejection by player 2 does not immediately  end the game, but leads 
by Guth,  Schmittberger  and Schwarz  [1982],  Guth and Tietz  [1985,  1986],  Kravitz 
and  Gunto  [1988]  and  Prasnikar  and  Roth  [1989].  In  all  other  studies  the 
ultimatum  bargaining  decisions  were  either  embedded  in  a  larger  [multiperiod] 
game context.  ..  or subjects  assumed  the positions  of both players in two different 
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instead  to a period in which player 2 may now propose a division  of 
some  smaller  quantity  8Q, which  player  1 may accept or reject. In 
the  two-period  game,  again  under  the  assumption  that  each 
player's own monetary  payoff is a measure  of his utility,  the perfect 
equilibrium  prediction  is that  player  1 will propose  ([1 -  6]Q, 8Q) 
and  player  2  will  accept  (since  in  the  next  period  the  perfect 
equilibrium  would be for player 2 to propose  (0, 8Q) and for player 
1  to  accept).  Ochs  and  Roth  [1989]  observed  that  it  was  not 
uncommon,  when  player  1 proposed  that  he receive  "too large"  a 
share x1 of Q (even though  x1 <  [1 -  8]Q),  that  player  2 rejected 
this  proposal  and  responded  with  a  "disadvantageous  counter- 
proposal"  that  even  if  accepted  would  give  him  less  than  the 
amount  x2  =  Q  -  x1 that  player  1 had  offered  him.  They  also 
reanalyzed  the  data from a number  of earlier  experiments  [Guth, 
Schmittberger,  and Schwarz,  1982; Binmore,  Shaked,  and Sutton, 
1985;  Guth  and  Tietz,  1988;  Neelin,  Sonnenschein,  and  Spiegel, 
1988]  and observed  that  this  phenomenon  had occurred  similarly 
in previous experiments.  In particular,  subjects in the role of player 
2 seemed prepared to reject markedly unequal  payoff distributions 
even if they could not expect to obtain a larger payoff in the second 
or subsequent  periods. 
Ochs  and  Roth  concluded  that  subjects  had  preferences  not 
only over their own monetary  payoffs, but also over distributions  of 
payoffs between  them and the other bargainer, and sketched  a class 
of  models  in  which  these  preferences  are  taken  into  account  in 
players'  strategic  decisions.  (For a set of experiments  that  investi- 
gate  such  a model in some  detail,  see Bolton  [1991],  and see Roth 
[1992]  for a survey.)  Guth and Tietz  [1990, p. 440],  however,  write 
that they "strictly reject" explanations  involving  tradeoffs between 
preferences  and  strategic  considerations.  Rather,  they  write,  "all 
our experiences  from ultimatum  bargaining  experiments  indicate 
that  subjects  do  not  'maximize'  but  are  guided  by  sometimes 
conflicting  behavioral norms." 
B. The Sequential  "Best-Shot"  Games of Harrison  and 
Hirshleifer 
These  games  also involved  two players.  (Harrison  and Hirsh- 
leifer  [1989]  observed  six subjects  in eighteen  one-period  encoun- 
ters:  each  subject  played  six  games  against  an  anonymous  oppo- 
nent  who  changed  from  period  to  period.)  The  rules  were  that 
player  1 states  a quantity  q1, after which  player 2, informed  of q1, 
states  a  quantity  q2. An  amount  of  public  good  equal  to  the 870  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
maximum  of q1 and q2 (the  "best-shot")  results,  and each player i 
receives  the  payoff corresponding  to  that  quantity  of public  good 
minus  $0.82  times  qi (see  Table  I).  Harrison  and  Hirshleifer  [p. 
207]  state:  "No  subject  was  informed  of the  payoffs  of any  other 
subject  in  our  experiments,  and  in  particular  the  fact  that  all 
valuation  schedules  were the  same was not revealed.  Our theoreti- 
cal analysis,  in  contrast,  presumes  that  the  payoffs  are  common 
public  knowledge."  Harrison  and Hirshleifer  go on to argue  that 
this  "informational  discrepancy"  made their experiments  a severe 
test  of the perfect equilibrium  predictions,  which  are that  player  1 
will choose q1 =  0 and player 2 will choose q2 = 4, giving player  1 a 
TABLE I 
REDEMPTION  VALUES  AND  EXPENDITURE  VALUES  FOR  THE  BEST-SHOT  FULL  AND 
PARTIAL  INFORMATION  GAMES 
Expenditure  values 
Redemption  values 
Cost to you 
Redemption  Total  of the 
Project  value  redemption  Number  of  number  of 
level  of specific  value of  units  units you 
(units)  units  all units  you provide  provide 
0  $0.00  $  0.00  0  $  0.00 
1  1.00  1.00  1  0.82 
2  0.95  1.95  2  1.64 
3  0.90  2.85  3  2.46 
4  0.85  3.70  4  3.28 
5  0.80  4.50  5  4.10 
6  0.75  5.25  6  4.92 
7  0.70  5.95  7  5.74 
8  0.65  6.60  8  6.56 
9  0.60  7.20  9  7.38 
10  0.55  7.75  10  8.20 
11  0.50  8.25  11  9.02 
12  0.45  8.70  12  9.84 
13  0.40  9.10  13  10.66 
14  0.35  9.45  14  11.48 
15  0.30  9.75  15  12.30 
16  0.25  10.00  16  13.12 
17  0.20  10.25  17  13.94 
18  0.15  10.35  18  14.76 
19  0.10  10.45  19  15.58 
20  0.05  10.50  20  16.40 
21  0.00  10.50  21  21.22 CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEqY  871 
profit of $3.70  and player 2 a $0.42  profit.6 That is, they  interpret 
their experimental  evidence,  which is strikingly  close to the perfect 
equilibrium  predictions,  as  evidence  in  favor  of  the  combined 
hypothesis  "that  subjects  correctly  conjectured  that  their  payoffs 
were  identical,"  and  that  they  would  play  perfect  equilibrium 
strategies  in the game which resulted. 
Note  also,  however,  that  players'  lack  of  information  about 
each  other's  payoffs  may  have  disabled  whatever  countervailing 
force in favor of more equal distributions  of payoffs was at work in 
the bargaining  games  reported  above. That  is, perhaps  the  reason 
subjects  in the  role  of player  2 were  willing  to  accept  a payoff of 
$0.42 was because they were unaware  (or unsure)  that player 1 was 
receiving  $3.70,  in  contrast  to  the  case  of ultimatum  bargaining 
games  in  which  such  extreme  payoff  disparities  proved  to  be 
unacceptable.7  (Guth's  [1988]  theory  of hierarchical  social norms, 
accessed  according to the information  available, would presumably 
account  for the results  in this  way.) This could potentially  explain 
why such a relatively  extreme  distribution  of payoffs was observed 
in the  data, but virtually  never in the  data from ultimatum  games 
for comparable amounts  of money.8 
The  first  comparison  in  the  new  experiment  reported  below 
was  designed  in part to distinguish  between  these  hypotheses,  by 
examining  sequential  best-shot  games  in which  the  subjects  were 
explicitly  told  that  their  payoffs  were  identical,  and  comparing 
these  with games in which they were not. (The results  of Roth and 
Murnighan  [1982]  show,  for a different  bargaining  environment, 
6.  To see that this is the unique  perfect equilibrium,  observe from Table I that 
if player 1 provides qi = 0, then  player 2's unique best response  is to provide q2 = 4, 
since the first four units  of public good all have a higher marginal value than the cost 
to player  2 of providing  each  unit,  while  the  fifth  unit  of public  good has  a lower 
marginal  value.  And if player  1 provides  a quantity  qi  2  1, then  player 2'-s unique 
best response  is to provide q2  = 0, which gives player 1 a strictly lower payoff than if 
he provides 0 and player 2 provides 4. 
7.  Guth  and  Tietz  [1988,  p.  113]  write  that  "Our  hypothesis  is  that  the 
consistency  of experimental  observations  and game theoretic  predictions  observed 
by Binmore  et  al....  is solely  due to the  moderate  relation  of equilibrium  payoffs 
which makes the game theoretic  solution  socially more acceptable."  They note that 
Binmore  et  al.  [1985]  examined  two-period  bargaining  games  whose  equilibrium 
prediction  was for payoffs in the ratio 3:1. In their  own experiment  Guth and Tietz 
employed  equilibrium  payoff ratios  of 9:1. So the  equilibrium  payoff ratio in these 
best-shot  games is virtually  identical  to those  in the bargaining  games discussed  by 
Guth and Tietz, since $3.70/$0.42  = 8.8. 
8.  Harrison  and Hirshleifer  report in a footnote  [1989,  p. 208,  fn. 7] that  they 
ran some  full information  games  with  similar  but somewhat  different  results.  In a 
personal communication  in reply to an earlier draft of this paper, Harrison informed 
us that there were procedural differences between  the games (including the fact that 
the games reported by Harrison  and Hirshleifer  were run by hand, while the games 
referred to in the footnote  were run by computer)  that precluded comparing them. 872  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
that  such  changes  in  information  may  have  important  effects  on 
the observed outcomes.) 
III.  EXPERIMENTAL  COMPARISON  OF BEST-SHOT  AND  ULTIMATUM 
GAMES 
The  subject pool for the  experiments  reported  here  consisted 
of  undergraduate  students  at  the  University  of  Pittsburgh.  No 
special  skill or experience  was required  for participation.  Subjects 
were told they  would be paid $5 for showing  up on time,  and that 
they  would  have  an opportunity  to  earn  additional  money  in the 
experiment. 
A. The Sequential  "Best-Shot"  Game 
The experiment  varied the information  players had about each 
other's  payoffs,  by  implementing  two  information  conditions. 
Subjects  in the full information  condition  were explicitly  told that 
each of them  had the same payoffs and in the instructions  this was 
stated  as: . . . "Attached  to the  instructions  you  will  find a sheet 
called  the  Redemption  Value  Sheet  which  is  identical  for  all 
individuals."  In the partial information  condition,  following  Harri- 
son and Hirshleifer  [1989]  the  information  about  the  payoffs was 
presented  as follows:  ". . . you will find a sheet  called the Redemp- 
tion Value Sheet.  It describes the value to you of the decisions  made 
in each round. You are not to reveal this information  to anyone. It is 
your own private information." 
Each  subject  participated  in  only  one  of  the  information 
conditions  in ten consecutive  encounters,  facing different individu- 
als. In the partial information  condition  there  were twenty  partici- 
pants.  In the full information  condition  there  were sixteen  partici- 
pants.9  Participants  were  assembled  in  a  room  and  randomly 
assigned  identification  numbers  that  determined  whether  they 
would be in the position  of the  first or second player. Accordingly, 
they  were  seated  on  the  left  or the  right  side  of  the  room.  The 
instructions  were distributed  and read aloud. The players were also 
required  to keep records  of the  quantities  provided by themselves 
and by the other agent,  maximum  quantity  selected,  and earnings. 
In  the  full  information  condition  the  players  also  recorded  the 
earnings  of the  other  player.  After  the  instructions  were  read,  a 
9.  The smaller number of players was due to "no shows"  among the subjects. CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEGY  873 
practice game was played. In the  subsequent  rounds,  each partici- 
pant  played  with  each  participant  on the  other  side  of the  room, 
without  knowing  with  whom  he  was  playing  in any given  round. 
Subjects  knew they  would be playing  with  a different  person  from 
round to round. In the full information  condition  subjects were told 
that  for  the  last  two  rounds  they  would  be  playing  participants 
with whom they had played in earlier rounds,  because  only sixteen 
players  participated.  (The  identification  numbers  of the  subjects 
were  changed  after  the  seventh  round  so that  they  would  not  be 
able to identify  whom  they  encountered  twice.)  Subjects  were told 
that,  at  the  conclusion  of the  experiment,  they  would  be paid in 
cash the sum of their earnings  in four out of the ten rounds,  which 
would be chosen  randomly. 
B.  Ultimatum  Game 
In  order  to  control  for  possible  effects  attributable  to  the 
subject  pool,  the  comparison  set  of  ultimatum  games  we  shall 
discuss  were run contemporaneously  with  the best-shot  games,  at 
the University  of Pittsburgh,  using  the same general procedures.10 
Sixteen  subjects  participated.  Subjects  had  $10  to  divide,"  so 
player  l's  proposal  was  a division  of the  form  ($x1, $x2) with x2 = 
$10  - x1. 
IV. PRINCIPAL  RESULTS FOR BEST-SHOT AND ULTIMATUM  GAMES 
A. Observations Related  to the Equilibrium  Predictions 
Table  II  reports  the  mean  offers  x2  (x2 =  Q -  x1)  in  the 
ultimatum  game, as well as the mean quantities  q, provided in the 
sequential  best-shot  games  under  full  and  partial  information. 
Recall  that  the  perfect  equilibrium  prediction  is  that  all  these 
10.  The ultimatum  games  were part of an ongoing  experimental  investigation 
(see  Roth,  Prasnikar,  Okuno-Fujiwara,  and  Zamir  [1991])  for  which  some  addi- 
tional comparisons  were required. For these comparisons,  player l's  were also asked 
to record what they thought  was the likelihood that their proposed division would be 
accepted, and player 2's were asked to record their estimate  of what the first player's 
proposal  would  be.  Proposed  divisions  had  to  be  in units  no  smaller  than  $0.05. 
Subjects  were told that,  at the  conclusion  of the experiment,  one of the  ten rounds 
would  be  chosen  at  random  and  they  would  be  paid  the  result  of  that  round. 
Subsequently,  further  data  have  been  gathered  on  these  games  from  the  same 
subject pool, and the data reported here are representative  of the larger data set. 
11.  In all of these  games,  the player l's  were described as buyers,  player 2's as 
sellers,  and  the  proposed  division  was  in  the  form  of  a  price  proposal,  with 
corresponding  payoffs (p,  10-p). 874  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
TABLE  II 
MEAN  OFFERS  BY  PERIODS  (VALUES  IN  PARENTHESES  ARE  STANDARD  ERRORS) 
Ultimatum  game  Best-shot  full  Best-shot  partial 
mean offers X2  information  game  information  game 
(perfect equilibrium  (perfect equilibrium  (perfect equilibrium 
Periods  prediction x2  =  0)  predictionq  =  0)  predictionq  =  0) 
1  4.188  1.625  2.700 
(0.329)  (0.610)  (0.617) 
2  3.825  0.875  2.900 
(0.530)  (0.482)  (0.994) 
3  3.725  1.125  3.000 
(0.480)  (0.597)  (0.848) 
4  3.581  0.125  2.100 
(0.438)  (0.116)  (0.793) 
5  4.231  0.125  2.700 
(0.276)  (0.116)  (0.906) 
6  4.418  0.125  1.250 
(0.234)  (0.116)  (0.605) 
7  4.294  0.000  1.100 
(0.166)  (0.000)  (0.537) 
8  4.531  0.000  0.800 
(0.155)  (0.000)  (0.505) 
9  4.325  0.000  0.950 
(0.232)  (0.000)  (0.567) 
10  4.531  0.000  0.700 
(0.155)  (0.000)  (0.401) 
Durbin-Watson**  2.27  2.01  1.945 
Mean  4.165  0.401  1.820 
(0.110)  (0.118)  (0.240) 
N  80  80  100 
**Durbin-Watson  Test for the transformed  residuals. 
quantities  will be zero. The observed  means  are reported round by 
round for each game. 12 
In the  sequential  best-shot  game  under  full  information,  the 
observed  means  converge  precisely  to the  equilibrium  prediction. 
For the  best-shot  games  under  partial  information,  although  the 
observed  means  move  in the  direction  of the  equilibrium  predic- 
tion, we reject the hypothesis  that the mean offers are equal for the 
12.  In  all  three  experiments  each  subject  played  ten  consecutive  games. 
Potential  learning  effects  (diminishing  variance  by  periods)  and  autocorrelation 
raise problems  for analyzing  the data. Econometric  methods  and tests  were used to 
handle the problem of heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation  over periods. Lety-t = 
[Lt  +  Eit,  where  i indexes  individuals  and t indexes  periods.  Consider  the  following CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEGY  875 
full  information  and  partial  information  game  for  each  period.13 
However,  the  observed  means  in both best-shot  games  are clearly 
much closer to zero than  are the observed means  in the ultimatum 
games,  which  are quite  similar  to the  observations  for ultimatum 
games that have already been reported in the literature. 
B. Behavior  Off the Equilibrium  Path 
Behavior off the equilibrium  path can be assessed  by consider- 
ing  how  player  2's  react  when  player  l's  offer  q1  >  0  in  the 
best-shot  games  or when  player  l's  offer x2  >  0  in the ultimatum 
games. The prediction of subgame perfect equilibrium  is in all cases 
that  player  1 will maximize  his  payoff by making  the  equilibrium 
offer; i.e., at perfect  equilibrium  the predicted response  of player 2 
is such that a positive  offer will yield player 1 a lower payoff than an 
offer of zero.  However,  as the  graphs  in Figure  I make  clear, the 
best-shot  games  exhibit  strikingly  different behavior in this regard 
than  the  ultimatum  games.14 In the  best-shot  games,  under  both 
information  conditions,  the  average  payoff  of  player  l's  who 
contributed  the equilibrium  quantity  q1 = 0 is greater than that  of 
player  l's  who  contributed  positive  quantities.  However,  in  the 
ultimatum  game, the average payoff to a player 1 who offers player 
2 an amount x2 rises to a maximum  for x2 between  four and five. So 
in  the  ultimatum  games  a  player  1  does  better  as  he  deviates 
further  from equilibrium,  but not in the best-shot  games. 
error structure: 
(*)Eit =  PEit-1 +  Uit,  E(ui)  =  2 
and  E(Eit,  Ejt)  =  0  if  i  ?  j.  To  test  whether  at  is  constant  across  t,  we  use  the 
Breusch-Pagan  (score)  test.  The  test  statistics  are 87.59  for the  full  information 
game,  17.95  for the  partial  information  game,  and 27.48  for the  ultimatum  game. 
Since  the  critical  value  is  x2  (0.95;9)  =  16.90,  this  indicates  the  presence  of 
heteroskedasticity.  We  corrected  for  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  using 
White's  [1980]  consistent  estimator  of E. To test  for autocorrelation,  we estimate  p 
in (*) while imposing  the constraint  dt  =  o2. The estimates  of p are 0.247  (standard 
error = 0.109)  for the full information  game, 0.644  (standard error =  0.076)  for the 
partial  information  game,  and  0.694  (standard  error =  0.081)  for the  ultimatum 
game. Thus, we also find evidence of positive  autocorrelation.  A test  of the joint null 
hypothesis  of no heteroskedasticity  and no autocorrelation  produced a test  statistic 
of 21.43  which is greater than the critical X2 (0.95;10)  =  18.30). All test  statistics  in 
the remainder  of the paper are based on the general error structure  (*). 
13.  We tested  the hypothesis  that the mean offer for the full information  game 
(pm  ) equaled  the  mean  offer in the  partial  information  game  (a  t) for each t. The 
(Wald) test  statistic  is  19.6,  which  is larger than  the  critical  vafue  x2 (0.95;10)  = 
18.3, and thus  we reject the null hypothesis  pft  =  Iipt, t =  1,2, .  .  , T. 
14.  In  the  graph  of  average  earnings  in  the  ultimatum  game,  offers  x2 are 
aggregated  by their integer  part; i.e., offers to player 2 of 4 and 4.5 are both listed as 
x2 = 4. For the unaggregated  data see Figure IV. 876  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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Average Earnings of Player 1 
C. Learning Behavior 
The fact that no player 1 deals with the same player 2 from one 
period to the  next,  and that  all play is anonymous,  preserves  the 
single-period strategic  character of the  games in this  experiment. 
However,  the  fact that  each  subject plays ten  consecutive  games CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS AND STRATEGY  877 
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Best-Shot  Game, Full Information:  Distribution  of Outcomes 
means that there is an opportunity for subjects to learn about the 
game, and about the behavior of other players in the subject  pool. 
One indicator of this is that the variance of the data in each 
round (see Table II) diminishes from round 1 to round 10 in all of 
the  games  (and goes  to  zero in  the  best-shot  full information 
condition). In the best shot games, half the player 1's in the full 
information condition (see Figure JJ)15  and nine out of ten of the 
player 1's in  the  partial information condition (see Figure III) 
began by offering positive quantities, but in the face of consistent 
lack of a positive reply by the player 2's the number of player 1's 
offering positive quantities steadily diminished. In contrast, in the 
ultimatum game (Figure IV) first player offers were closest to the 
equilibrium prediction in the first four rounds, but in the face of 
steady rejections, the lowest offer x2 steadily climbed. We can also 
look for an effect of learning by testing if the mean offers are the 
same  in  all  the  periods.16 The  tests  show  that  only  for  the 
15.  Figures  II and  III are read as follows.  Each  outcome  is represented  by a 
circle  centered  on  that  outcome,  with  the  number  of  occurences  of  a  particular 
outcome  reflected by the size of the circle, and the  number  next to it. For example, 
Figure  II  shows  that  in  round  1  of  the  full  information  condition  the  outcome 
(ql,  q2)  =  (4,0) was observed twice, while the outcomes  (2,1), (0,1),  (0,3),  (0,4),  (3,4), 
and (0,5) were each observed once. 
16.  The  test  statistics  Y and critical  F values  are as follows:  (1) time  specific 
fixed  effect  versus  no time  effect  (i.e.,  the  mean  was  restricted  to be  equal  in  all 
periods)  for the  full  information  game  (Y =  3.038,  F(0.95;9,70)  =  2.03),  (2) time 
specific fixed effect versus  no time effect for the partial information  game (Y =  2.32, 
F(0.95;9;90)  =  2.08),  (3)  time  specific  fixed  effect  versus  no  time  effect  for  the 
ultimatum  game (Y =  1.029, F(0.95;9,70)  =  2.03). 878  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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Best-Shot  Game, Partial  Information:  Distribution  of Outcomes 
In the first round there was one additional  outcome  of (ql, q2)  =  (7, 21). In the 
second round there was one additional  outcome  of (ql, q2)  =  (11, 0). 
ultimatum  game is the hypothesis  of equal mean  offers by periods 
not rejected. 
Figures  II and III give a clear picture  of the learning  that took 
place  in  the  best-shot  games,  and  how  it  differed  in  the  two 
information  conditions.  Looking  first  at  the  full  information 
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condition,  Figure  II shows  that  only  in  the  first  four  rounds  are 
there  outcomes  at which  both  player  1 and 2 contribute  positive 
quantities.  From round 5 on no more than  one player in each pair 
contributes  a positive  quantity,  and from round  7 on no player  1 
contributed  a positive  quantity,  while  the  number  of  player  2's 
contributing  a positive  quantity  rose from five out of eight in round 
7 to seven  out of eight  in round  10, with  the modal response  being 
the  equilibrium  quantity.  In  the  partial-information  condition 
Figure  III  shows  that  while  it  did not  take  much  longer  for the 
players  to  learn  that  only  one  of them  should  provide  a positive 
quantity,  even  by round  10 there  were  still  pairs  in which  it was 
player  1 who  was  providing  the  public  good.  Thus,  the  evidence 
suggests  that  in  the  full  information  condition  player  l's  were 
better able to anticipate  the reaction of player 2's. 
V.  INTERPRETATION  OF THE  RESULTS 
One of the hypotheses  with  which we began this investigation 
was  that  the  convergence  to  perfect  equilibrium  quantities  ob- 
served  by  Harrison  and  Hirshleifer  [1989],  in  stark  contrast  to 
experimental  results  for  ultimatum  bargaining  games,  might  be 
due  to  the  fact  that  participants  in  their  experiment  were  not 
informed  of one  another's  payoffs.  This  has  not  proved to be the 
case: in both of our information  conditions  for best-shot  games, the 
observed quantities  provided approach the equilibrium  quantity  by 
the tenth  round;17 in contrast  to the  results  for ultimatum  games, 
in which the results  remain far from the equilibrium  predictions. 
That  these  two  different  classes  of games  yield  very  different 
results  in  spite  of having  very  similar  perfect  equilibrium  predic- 
tions  thus  seems  to be a reliable result.  Our evidence  suggests  that 
the  explanation  for this  difference  lies  in  the  off the  equilibrium 
path behavior  (recall Figure  j).18  It is illuminating  in this  connec- 
17.  Of course  we did observe  differences  between  the  two  information  condi- 
tions.  And  although  Harrison  and  Hirshliefer's  [1989]  experimental  instructions 
implemented  a  version  of  our  partial-information  condition,  their  results  more 
closely resemble  those  of our full-information  condition.  These observations  suggest 
that,  here as in Roth and Murnighan  [1982],  information  is a volatile  experimental 
variable  that  requires  extremely  careful  control.  This  is particularly  so since there 
are  many  opportunities  for  experiments  to  reveal  to  subjects  information  about 
which  nothing  is  said  in  the  formal  instructions,  for example,  through  repeated 
play, or when questions  are answered  in the course of presenting  the instructions. 
18.  Alternative  explanations  offered  in  the  earlier  literature  concerned  with 
bargaining  games  seem  to have  little  force  here.  Since  the  equilibrium  payoffs  in 
these  best-shot  games  are as extreme  as those  in the  games  examined  by Guth and 
Tietz  [1988]  (recall  our  footnote  7), the  observation  of equilibrium  play  in  these 
games  but  not in those  (and not  in the  ultimatum  games)  cannot  be attributed  to 880  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
TABLE  III 
THE  PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE SEQUENTIAL "BEST-SHOT"  GAME 
Player 2 provides 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
0  0, 0  1.00, 0.14  1.95, 0.31  2.85,  0.39  3.70,  0.42  4.50,  0.40 
1  0.18,  1.00  0.18,  0.18  1.13, 0.31  2.03,  0.39  2.88,  0.42  3.68,  0.40 
Player  1  2  0.31,  1.95  0.31,  1.13  0.31,0.31  1.21,0.39  2.06,  0.42  2.86,  0.40 
provides  3  0.39,  2.85  0.39,  2.03  0.39,  1.21  0.39,  0.39  1.24, 0.42  2.04,  0.40 
4  0.42,  3.70  0.42,  2.88  0.42,  2.06  0.42,  1.24  0.42,  0.42  1.22, 0.40 
5  0.40,  4.50  0.40,  3.68  0.40,  2.86  0.40,  2.04  0.40,  1.22  0.40,  0.40 
tion  to examine  the  payoffs to the  players  for each pair of actions 
for  the  two  kinds  of  games.  Table  III  shows  the  payoffs  to  the 
players in the best-shot  games for each pair (q1, q2). (Note that this 
is not a strategic  form representation  of the  game:  since  player  2 
moves  second,  his  strategies  are  not  simple  quantities  q2, but 
rather  functions  from  q1  to  q2).  Once  player  1  departs  from 
equilibrium  and  offers  a positive  q1, player  2's  best  response  is 
always  to  provide  q2 =  0. This  conforms  with  the  observation  in 
Figure  I  that  player  l's  got  little  positive  reinforcement  for 
departures  from equilibrium.  This contrasts  with the incentives  to 
player  2's  in  the  ultimatum  game,  who  have  more  incentive  to 
accept an offer the farther  it is from equilibrium.  And this  in turn 
conforms  with  the  behavior  observed  in  the  ultimatum  game 
(compare  Figures  I  and  IV).  The  data  thus  clearly  support  the 
"strategic  hypothesis"  as opposed to the "information  hypothesis" 
as outlined  in our introduction,  for these  games. 
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE  HYPOTHESIS 
Guth  and Tietz  [1990]  suggest  that  best-shot  games  are not 
appropriate  comparisons  to ultimatum  games  for the  purposes  of 
discerning  how  strategic  considerations  may interact  with  percep- 
tions  of fairness.  In particular,  they propose that considerations  of 
fairness  may not arise in best-shot  games because the set of feasible 
agreements  is not convex,  so that there  is no way for the players to 
differences  in the distributions  of income.  Conversely,  the persistence  of much more 
equal  payoff distributions  in the  ultimatum  games  cannot  easily  be attributed  to 
lack of understanding  or experience,  since the ultimatum  game players  had no less 
experience  than  the  best-shot  players,  and  by  virtually  any  measure  it  is  the 
best-shot  game that is more complex and difficult to understand. CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEGY  881 
share  the  maximum  payoff  equally.  Specifically,  they  say  the 
following:  "Equal  positive  contributions  in  best  shot  games  are 
obviously  inefficient  since  one  of  the  two  contributions  is  com- 
pletely useless.  If sharing the burden of providing the public good is 
impossible,  fairness  considerations  cannot  be  applied.  Further- 
more, the very obvious  aspect of efficiency requires  extreme  payoff 
distributions"  [p. 428]. 
These  comments  refine  Guth  and  Tietz's  [1988]  hypothesis 
concerning  the  role played by extreme  payoff distributions  (recall 
footnote  7), by adding considerations  of convexity  and efficiency. In 
doing so, they raise a clear counterhypothesis  to the interpretation 
we have given above to the observed  differences  between  best-shot 
and  ultimatum  games.  According  to  our  interpretation,  the  dif- 
ferent  off-the-equilibrium-path  properties  of  the  two  games  is 
responsible  for the different  observed behavior,  despite the compa- 
rably  unequal  payoff  distribution  at  equilibrium.  The  contrary 
hypothesis  now suggested  by the remarks of Guth and Tietz  [1990] 
is that  the  different  observed  behavior  in the  two games  is due to 
the  fact  that  players  are  concerned  with  fairness  only  in  the 
ultimatum  games,  and that  no comparable  considerations  arise in 
the  best-shot  games  in  which  equality  is  incompatible  with 
efficiency. 
To test  this hypothesis,  we next consider  a game with extreme 
equilibrium  payoffs, but with  a convex  set of efficient  agreements. 
While this  game differs from the  games  we have been  considering 
in a number  of respects,  most  notably  in the  number  of players,  it 
allows  us  to  compare  the  nonstrategic  and  strategic  hypotheses 
that have been advanced to explain their behavior. 
A. Sequential  Market Games with Many Buyers and  One Seller 
Each  sequential  market  consisted  of  one  seller  and  nine 
buyers.  As  in  the  ultimatum  games,  each  buyer  offered  a price, 
which  if  accepted  determined  the  division  of  $10  between  the 
successful  buyer and the seller.  (If the seller accepts an offerp  from 
buyer  1, then that buyer earns $10  -  p , the seller earns $p, and all 
other buyers  earn $0. If the seller rejects all offers, then  all players 
in  the  market  receive  $0.)  Twenty  subjects  participated,  each 
playing ten rounds.  In each round, two markets,  A and B, operated 
simultaneously,  and  buyers  were  switched  between  the  markets 
from round to round,  so that  the  composition  of the  markets  was 882  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
not  the  same  in  any  two  rounds.19  In  each  round  every  buyer 
submitted  a price,  and  the  maximum  price  in  each  market  was 
reported to the  seller in that  market,  who could accept or reject it. 
The  transactions  were  then  made  public  (by being  recorded  on  a 
blackboard).  Successful  buyers were identified  only by anonymous 
identification  numbers.  If more than  one buyer  offered the  maxi- 
mum price (and it was accepted), then one of those buyers would be 
chosen at random to complete the transaction.  As in the ultimatum 
games,  $0.05  was  the  smallest  unit  in  which  prices  could  be 
stated.20 
The stage game just  described can be thought  of as an auction 
for  an  indivisible  good  worth  $10  to  any  buyer.  Any  subgame 
perfect  equilibrium  gives  (virtually)  all  the  wealth  to  the  seller. 
Specifically,  any  distribution  of  prices  can  occur  at  a  perfect 
equilibrium  if two or more buyers bid $10, and (since bids must  be 
discrete)  another  perfect  equilibrium  has all buyers bidding $9.95. 
Thus, the equilibrium  distribution  of income has all buyers earning 
either  zero or a one-ninth  probability  of earning  $0.05,  while  the 
seller earns either  $10.00  or $9.95. 
However,  in this game all transactions,  not merely equilibrium 
transactions,  are  efficient.  There  are  two  kinds  of  equal-payoff 
outcomes:  if all buyers  offer a price of $1, then  every player has an 
expected  payoff of $1, and if all buyers  offer a price of $5, then  the 
successful  buyer  will  have  the  same  payoff  as the  seller  (and  all 
buyers will have the same expected payoff of $0.56). 
Thus,  this  game has equilibrium  payoff distributions  that  are 
as extreme  as those  of the ultimatum  or best-shot  games,  but  (like 
the ultimatum  game and unlike  the best-shot  game) it has efficient 
equal-payoff outcomes.  It therefore  presents  an opportunity  to test 
the  conjecture  that  the  observed  outcomes  of the best-shot  games 
were intimately  related to the fact that  equal payoffs in that  game 
can only be achieved inefficiently. 
19.  In each round each buyer knew  the market  in which  he was participating, 
but  not  which  other  buyers  were  in the  same  market.  This  was  intended  to make 
each  round  resemble  as closely  as  possible  a one-period  game,  by eliminating  the 
possibility  that  buyers  could coordinate  their  efforts  (e.g., by taking  turns  at being 
the high bidder). See Ochs [1990] for a fuller discussion  of this kind of manipulation. 
20.  These  market  games  were conducted  so as to be as comparable as possible 
to the ultimatum  games,  so as to allow further  comparisons  as part of a larger study 
[Roth,  Prasnikar,  Okuno-Fujiwara,  and Zamir,  1991].  As in the  ultimatum  game, 
subjects  remained  either  buyers  or sellers  for all ten  rounds,  and one  round  was 
chosen  at random to determine  the payoffs. As in the case of the ultimatum  games, 
the  data  reported  here  are  representative  of the  larger  data  set  that  has  subse- 
quently been collected. TABLE  IV 
THE  HIGHEST  AND  SECOND  HIGHEST  PRICES  IN  EACH  OF  THE  MARKETS  AND  THE 
BASIC  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS 
The second 
The highest  highest  Mean 
Period  Market  price $p*  price $p*  (SD)  Mode  Median  N** 
1  A  8.90  (1)  8.25  (1)  6.48  8.05  8.05  9 
(2.52) 
B  9.90  (1)  8.95  (1)  6.76  5.00  6.50  9 
(1.84) 
2  A  9.60  (1)  9.00  (1)  6.57  5.00  8.05  9 
(3.07) 
B  9.90  (1)  9.00  (2)  6.69  x  8.00  9 
(3.26) 
3  A  9.85  (1)  9.65  (1)  7.24  x  9.00  9 
(3.24) 
B  10.00  (1)  9.95  (1)  8.08  x  9.00  9 
(2.31) 
4  A  10.00  (2)  9.95  (2)  7.32  x  9.90  9 
(4.00) 
B  9.95  (1)  9.90  (1)  7.31  9.00  9.00  9 
(2.67) 
5  A  10.00  (2)  9.95  (2)  9.14  x  9.90  9 
(1.61) 
B  10.00  (2)  9.95  (2)  7.93  x  8.50  9 
(2.76) 
6  A  10.00  (3)  9.95  (1)  7.21  10.00  9.00  9 
(3.69) 
B  10.00  (1)  9.95  (4)  7.81  9.95  9.95  9 
(3.32) 
7  A  10.00  (1)  9.95  (2)  6.43  x  7.00  9 
(3.28) 
B  10.00  (1)  9.60  (1)  5.23  5.00  5.00  9 
(3.07) 
8  A  10.00  (2)  9.85  (1)  5.76  x  5.00  9 
(3.74) 
B  10.00  (2)  9.85  (1)  5.72  x  7.00  9 
(4.31) 
9  A  10.00  (1)  9.95  (1)  4.73  x  5.00  9 
(4.11) 
B  10.00  (1)  9.95  (1)  5.98  x  5.00  9 
(3.72) 
10  A  10.00  (2)  9.95  (1)  6.22  x  9.00  9 
(4.23) 
B  10.00  (2)  9.95  (1)  6.47  5.00  5.00  9 
(3.32) 
*The number  in parentheses  is the number of buyers who bid that price. 
**N represents  the number of buyers in each of the markets. 
x An x in the mode column  means  that there were fewer than three observations  at any one price. 884  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
The  results  are  summarized  in  Table  IV,  which  shows  the 
highest  and second highest  prices bid in each market in each round, 
and the  number  of bids received  at each  of those  prices,  together 
with  statistics  on the  remaining  bids.  (Neither  seller  rejected  the 
maximum  bid  in  any  round.)  By  the  fifth  round  prices  had 
converged  to equilibrium,  and all subsequent  transactions  were at 
the  equilibrium  price  of  $10.21  That  is,  contrary  to  the  above 
conjecture,  we  see  very  unequal  payoffs  emerging  even  though 
equal payoffs are also efficient. 
Table IV also makes clear that  (except in round 7 in market B) 
from round 5 on no buyer could have increased  his payoff by more 
than  $0.05  by changing  his bid. In particular,  the  high  bidders  in 
these  rounds  (who  always  received  zero)  were  always  competing 
with  either  another  bidder  who  made  the  same  bid,  or one  who 
made a bid that  was only $0.05  less.  Thus,  in this  game,  as in the 
best-shot  game  and  in  contrast  to  the  ultimatum  game  (recall 
Figure I), the observed pattern  of play is such that agents could not 
increase  their payoff by deviating  from the equilibrium  prediction. 
This lends  further  support  to the  strategic  hypothesis  proposed to 
explain  the  difference  in  behavior  observed  between  those  two 
games. 
It is noteworthy  that  the  high  bids  were  not  submitted  by a 
small  proportion  of  the  buyers  (in  which  case  we  might  have 
supposed that the high bidders were unrepresentative  of the buyer 
population).  Half  of the buyers  (nine out of eighteen)  submitted  at 
least one bid of $10. At the same time  (and also consistent  with the 
equilibrium  prediction)  Table IV also shows that there was consid- 
erable  diversity.  The  equal-payoff  bid of $5 was  the  modal  bid in 
four  (out  of twenty)  market  rounds,  with  two  of these  coming  in 
rounds  7 and  10, when  the buyers  who  made these  proposals  had 
abundant  evidence  that  these  would  not be the winning  bids,  and 
that  all bids  would  yield  zero  or negligible  payoffs.  So these  bids 
may be  (cautiously)  interpreted  as  evidence  that  the  ideas  about 
fairness  captured  by the  equal payoff outcomes  in this  game  were 
present  in this  subject  population.22 Nevertheless,  as in the  best- 
21.  In  subsequent  experiments  with  this  game,  the  transaction  price  has 
sometimes  settled  down at $9.95  (see Roth, Prasnikar,  Okuno-Fujiwara,  and Zamir 
[1991]). 
22.  The  idea here  is that,  once  the  equilibrium  becomes  established,  so that 
bidders  observe  that  no bid they  make  will  earn  them  positive  profits,  then  some 
bidders  may  choose  their  bids  on  other  criteria,  and  the  observation  of  $5  bids 
suggests  that these  have some appeal. CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAMRNESS AND  STRATEGY  885 
shot  games,  the  dynamics  of the  game  forced the  outcome  toward 
equilibrium.23 
Note  that  we  are not  claiming  that  the  dynamics  that  led to 
equilibrium  in the later rounds  of this  game are necessarily  due to 
simple  income  maximization,  although  it  would  be  surprising  if 
this did not play some role. To be clear about what we mean, it may 
be useful  to speculate  a little,  beyond  the  evidence,  about buyers' 
motivations.  Consider  a hypothetical  buyer  whose  preference  for 
equality  is such that his very first choice outcome  would be to have 
all  buyers  submit  identical  bids  of  $5  (or  $1),  and  who  bids 
accordingly  in  the  first  two  rounds.  When  he  sees  how  high  the 
actual  transaction  price  is,  he  becomes  annoyed  with  the  other 
buyers,  and (with the same motivation  that would have caused him 
to express his displeasure  by rejecting too small an offer if he were a 
seller in the ultimatum  game) he decides to become the high bidder 
in round 3, in order to deprive other buyers  of the benefits  of what 
he  sees  as their  unreasonable  behavior.  The  point  in considering 
such  a  hypothetical  buyer  is  to  observe  that  in  this  game  his 
nonmonetary  preferences  cause  him  to  behave  in  a  manner 
indistinguishable  from an income  maximizer,  while  in the ultima- 
tum  game  his  preferences  lead  away  from  the  equilibrium  pre- 
dicted  for  income  maximizers.  The  difference  lies  not  in  the 
preferences,  or  in  the  "social  norms"  elicited  by  the  game  that 
these  preferences  may reflect, but in how such preferences  interact 
in the different games,  and in the outcome  that emerges.24 
VII.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
In  this  paper  we  have  reported  experimental  observations, 
under comparable conditions,  of three  different kinds of games,  all 
of  which  have  very  unequal  payoff  distributions  at  equilibrium, 
when  players  are  assumed  to  be  simple  income  maximizers.  In 
23.  A number  of people have expressed  surprise  that  subjects  would make  an 
(equilibrium)  bid that guaranteed  them zero profit, but have found it less surprising 
that in subsequent  replications  of this market the maximum  price in many rounds is 
$9.95,  which  gives a profit of $0.05  to the winning  bidder. It seems  to us, however, 
that both bids are equally surprising  or unsurprising,  since for all practical purposes 
the  difference  in  expected  payoff  between  the  two  bids  is  negligible.  And  the 
convergence  to equilibrium  in this  game is robust: to date we have seen it in each of 
the  replications  we  have  conducted  in  four  countries  (see  Roth,  Prasnikar, 
Okuno-Fujiwara,  and Zamir [1991]). 
24.  And to the extent  that players' preferences,  including  their preferences  for 
"fairness,"  interact  in  different  ways  in  different  games,  it seems  appropriate  to 
model  these  preferences  separately  from  the  game  itself,  for  example  in  the 
preferences  of the players, as suggested  by Ochs and Roth [1989]. 886  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
ultimatum  games the observed payoff distributions  are much more 
equal than the (income-maximizing)  equilibrium  distributions,  but 
in  the  best-shot  and  market  games  the  (income-maximizing) 
equilibrium  payoff distributions  were observed with great clarity. 
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  although  equilib- 
rium  predictions  may  need  to  be  modified  to  take  into  account 
nonmonetary  aspects  of players'  preferences  (e.g.,  in the  ultima- 
tum  games),  nevertheless,  even  when  equilibrium  yields  very 
unequal  payoffs,  strategic  considerations  are  not  displaced  by 
considerations  of  equity.  On  the  contrary,  the  best-shot  and 
market  games  show  that  whether  equilibria  will  be  observed 
depends  on the off-the-equilibrium-path  behavior,  which  responds 
to the  off-the-equilibrium-path  incentives.25 And we could almost 
take  this  to  be  a  definition  of  strategic  thinking,  in  which  the 
predicted behavior is maximizing  behavior that correctly takes into 
account  agents'  responses  to alternative  courses  of action. 
At  the  same  time  it  should  be  emphasized  again  that  the 
ultimatum  games  show  that  ideas  about  fairness  need  not  be 
displaced  by  considerations  of  strategy,  either.  The  preferences 
that player 2's exhibit for relatively  equal payoff distributions  are if 
anything  probably  reinforced  by  experience  with  the  game  (see 
Figure  IV),  since  low  offers  became  rare.  In  contrast,  Figure  II 
shows  that  in  the  best-shot  game,  player  2's  also  displayed 
considerable  resistance  to unequal  distributions,  since in rounds  4 
through  7,  40  percent  (12  out  of  30)  of  the  outcomes  in  which 
player  1 provided q1 = 0 resulted  in player 2 providing q2 =  0 also. 
But in the best-shot  game, in contrast  to the ultimatum  game, low 
offers  by  player  1 persisted,  and  the  reluctance  of  player  2's  to 
accept unequal  distributions  seems  to have  largely  worn  down by 
round  10. So the different behavior  off the equilibrium  path in the 
two  games  ultimately  affected  the  behavior  on  the  equilibrium 
path. 
To summarize,  results  in the  experimental  literature  indicate 
that  ideas  about  fairness  may play an important  role in subjects' 
preferences  or  expectations,  and  that  this  may  have  significant 
25.  A related conclusion  is suggested  by the work of Forsythe,  Horowitz,  Savin, 
and Sefton  [1992],  one aspect  of which  compared ultimatum  games  with  "dictator 
games,"  in which  the  first player's  proposal was the  outcome  of the  game  (it could 
not be rejected  by the  second  player).  These  two  games  yielded  different  distribu- 
tions  of first player proposals,  suggesting  that  in the  ultimatum  game first players 
anticipate  the  reaction  of  second  players.  Similarly,  see  the  different  results  for 
related  bargaining  games  with  extreme  equilibrium  predictions  reported  in Rapo- 
port, Weg, and Felsenthal  [1990]; Weg, Rapoport, and Felsenthal  [1990];  Weg and 
Zwick [1990]. CONSIDERATIONS  OF FAIRNESS  AND  STRATEGY  887 
consequences  for the  outcome  of a game.  The evidence  presented 
here  suggests  that  the  nature  of these  consequences  may depend 
critically  on traditional  game-theoretic  considerations  concerning 
the anticipated  behavior  of other players  (even when  this behavior 
reflects  concern  for  fairness).  So  this  evidence  suggests  that 
descriptive  theories  of observable  behavior  in strategic  situations 
will  retain  a clear game-theoretic  character,  even  though  players' 
motivations  may be more complex  than  simple  income  maximiza- 
tion.  However,  the nature  of these  complex yet robust motivations 
cannot be ignored. 
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